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I Comments I
It's Not You, It's Me: An Analysis of the
United States' Failure to Uphold its
Commitment to OECD Guidelines for
Multination Enterprises in Spite of No Other
Reliable Alternatives
Matthew H. Kita*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 1960, the United States joined nineteen other
countries in becoming a member of the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (hereinafter the "OECD") by signing the
Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University (2011). Member, PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, 2009-2011,
Comments Editor 2010-2011. B.S., The Pennsylvania State University (2006). I would
like to thank Professor Larry CatA Backer for introducing me to transnational law and
encouraging me to continue my study of the area outside the classroom. I would also like
to thank my parents for keeping me in line during my youth and my brother for
challenging me to be published more than him. Finally, I would like to extend my thanks
and gratitude to the entire staff of the PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW for their
hard work and assistance throughout the publication process.
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Development. On June 27, 2000, the United States reaffirmed its
commitment by adopting the OECD's revised Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (hereinafter "Guidelines"). In what appears to
be the largest demonstration of its commitment to the OECD, the United
States annually provides a quarter of the OECD's EUR 320 million
budget.2 The OECD is a transregional group that has developed its own
programs for social responsibility, namely the Guidelines, which act as
transnational soft laws for those parties that voluntarily adhere to it.3
With its affirmations and reaffirmations, along with its enormous
contribution to the annual budget, the United States, one might expect,
would have an active role in the OECD and would take action to uphold
the Guidelines. This Comment addresses whether the United States has
taken such action, and whether it has fulfilled its responsibilities to the
OECD and other member countries. To address the two preceding
issues, transnational law must first be examined and the OECD and its
goals analyzed. Transnational law is considered "soft law" because of its
voluntary nature, so this Comment will analyze the OECD Guidelines in
their capacity as "soft law."
Within each country that is a member of the OECD, a National
Contact Point (hereinafter "NCP") acts as the link between Multinational
Enterprises (hereinafter "MNE") and the country's commitment to the
OECD Guidelines. The NCP handles complaints against MNEs and has
the obligation to publicize the Guidelines in its country.5
After discussing the OECD and the Guidelines as soft law, this
Comment will compare the United States' utilization of the Guidelines to
that of the United Kingdom.6 Finally, conclusions will be drawn
regarding (1) whether the United States has upheld its obligations to the
OECD and its member countries and (2) whether upholding the
obligations would in fact be beneficial the United States.
1. See OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649 201185_1915847_1 l_1 1,00.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
2. See OECD, Scale of Members' Contribution to OECD's Core Budget-2009,
http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,3343,en_2649_201185_31420750_ 1 _1,00.html
(last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
3. See William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global
Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501, 509 (2001).
4. Id. at 5 10.
5. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 33 (2000).
6. See discussion infra Part III, VI.
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II. TRANSNATIONAL LAW (SOFT LAW)
A. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development's
mission is to "bring together the governments of countries committed to
democracy and the market economy from around the world" for reasons
that include raising the standards of living around the world and assisting
countries' economic development.' The Organization "provides a setting
where governments compare policy experiences, seek answers to
common problems, identify good practice and coordinate domestic and
international policies."8  Comprised of thirty countries,9 the OECD has
about 200 committees that work to advance policy in the areas of
economics, trade, science, employment, education, and financial
markets. o
1. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
With the input of the various committees, the Guidelines" were
created.12  The Guidelines are "recommendations addressed by
7. See OECD, About the OECD, www.oecd.org/aboutoecd (last visited Oct. 15,
2009).
8. Id.
9. See OECD, OECD Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/pages/
0,3417,en 36734052_36761800 1 1 111,00.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). The 30
member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. In May 2007, OECD countries agreed to invite Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia, and
Slovenia to open discussions for membership of the Organization and offered enhanced
engagement, with a view to possible membership, to Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and
South Africa. The process of becoming a member is complex and can be long as it
involves the evaluation of the country's ability to meet OECD standards throughout many
policy areas, making it hard to bring large groups of new members in at the same time.
Id.
10. See OECD, Who Does What, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,
en_36734052_36761791 _1 1 1l,00.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
I1. Guidelines, supra note 5, at 7. The Guidelines are created with the idea that
adhering countries consider that international investment is of major importance to the
world economy, and has considerably contributed to the development of their countries;
that multinational enterprises play an important role in this investment process; that
international co-operation can improve the foreign investment climate, encourage the
positive contribution which multinational enterprises can make to economic, social and
environmental progress, and minimize and resolve difficulties which may arise from their
operations; and that the benefits of international cooperation are enhanced by addressing
issues relating to international investment and multinational enterprises through a
balanced framework of interrelated instruments. Id.
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governments to multinational enterprises . .. [that] provide voluntary
principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with
applicable laws." 3 In adopting the Guidelines, the member countries
recommended that "multinational enterprises operating in or from their
territories ... observ[e] the Guidelines. ... When dealing with
multinational enterprises, member countries commit to treating Foreign-
Controlled Enterprises the same as domestic enterprises ("National
Treatment").' 5 Those same member countries agree to promote the use
of the Guidelines by establishing NCPsl 6 that "act as a forum for the
discussion of all matters relating to the Guidelines."17
The Guidelines are comprised of three parts, dealing with the
Guidelines themselves, the implementation of the Guidelines, and
commentaries. In summarizing the Guidelines, this Comment will
quickly discuss each section to provide an overview of its form and
function.
Part one of the Guidelines spells out the guidelines themselves in
ten sections. The first section of the Guidelines sets out the Concepts
12. The 200 Committees and Bodies that exist in the OECD include the Committee
for Agriculture (COAG), the Committee for Financial Markets, and the Economic Policy
Committee. Each committee and body provides suggestions and guidance in its
particular specialty when creating the OECD Guidelines. OECD, Bodies/Groups Sorted
by Parent Body/Group, http://webnet3.oecd.org/OECD groups/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
13. Guidelines, supra note 5, at 9 ("The Guidelines aim to ensure that the operations
of these enterprises are in harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of
mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in which they operate, to help
improve the foreign investment climate and to enhance the contribution to sustainable
development made by multinational enterprises.").
14. See id. at 5.
15. Id. "In order to maintain public order, to protect their essential security interest
and to fulfill commitments relating to international peace and security, countries shall
treat foreign-controlled enterprises as they would treat domestic enterprises. Foreign-
controlled enterprises should receive no less favorable treatment than that accorded in
like situations to domestic enterprises." Id.
16.
Adhering countries shall set up National Contact Points for undertaking
promotional activities, handling inquiries and for discussions with the parties
concerned on all matters covered by the Guidelines so that they can contribute
to the solution of problems which may arise in this connection, taking due
account of the procedural guidance. The business community, employee
organizations, and other interested parties shall be informed of the availability
of such facilities. National Contact Points in different countries shall cooperate
if such need arises, on any matter related to the Guidelines relevant to their
activities. As a general procedure, discussions at the national level should be
initiated before contacts with other National Contact Points are undertaken.
National Contact Points shall meet annually to share experiences and report to
the Investment Committee.
Id. at 30.
17. Id. at 13.
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and Principles.' 8 The concepts include those previously mentioned, such
as the equal treatment of foreign-owned enterprises and the creation of
NCPs.' 9 The section also explains that "international dispute settlement
mechanisms, including arbitration, are encouraged as a means of
facilitating the resolution of legal problems arising between enterprises
and host country governments."20
Part one, section two lays out the General Policies enterprises
should take into account in the countries in which they operate.
Focusing on the MNEs, Enterprises are encouraged to "contribute to
economic, social, and environmental progress";22 respect human rights;23
develop and adhere to good corporate governance practices;24 promote
employee awareness of the Guidelines;2 5 and abstain from "improper
involvement in local political activities."26
The third section of part one deals with the disclosures of an
27enterprise. These disclosures range from the company objectives to
material, foreseeable risk factors. 28  The Guidelines allow for the
tailoring of the disclosures to the "nature, size and location of the
enterprise, with due regard taken of costs, business confidentiality and
other competitive concerns."2 9
Sections four through ten are the more policy-specific sections
covering topics from employment relations to taxation.30
The second part of the Guidelines deals with the Guidelines'
Implementation Procedures. The first procedure for implementing the
Guidelines is the establishment of an NCP for promoting the activities of
the OECD while also handling any disputes between the parties
concerned with matters relating to the Guidelines, with the goal of
contributing to the solution of the problem.3 1 The NCPs must meet
18. See Guidelines, supra note 5, at 12.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id at 14.
22. Id.
23. See Guidelines, supra note 5, at 14.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 15.
28. See Guidelines, supra note 5, at 15.
29. Id.
30. Getting into the more policy specific sections of the Guidelines, the fourth
section deals with Employment and Industrial Relations. The sixth section is aimed at
Combating Bribery. The seventh section deals with Consumer Interests. The eighth
section covers Science and Technology. The ninth section covers Competition, and the
tenth section covers Taxation. Id. at 17-25.
31. Id. at 30. (More specifically, "the business community, employee organizations,
and other interested parties shall be informed of the availability of such facilities.")
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annually to share their experiences and report to the Investment
Committee, which is part of the OECD organization. 32
The third and final part of the Guidelines presents commentaries
prepared by the Investment Committee "to provide information on and
explanation of the Guidelines text and of the Council Decision on
Implementation of the Guidelines."
2. The National Contact Point
Within each country, the NCP has the responsibility of furthering
the effectiveness of the Guidelines while operating with "visibility,
accessibility, transparency and accountability." 34  There are four
important aspects regarding the NCP: Institutional Arrangements;
Information and Promotion; Implementation in Specific Instances; and
Reporting.
In terms of Institutional Arrangements, the NCP will seek "the
active support of social partners, including the business community,
employee organizations, and other interested parties which includes non-
governmental organizations." The NCP can be a government official,
an office headed by a senior official, or a co-operative body including
representatives of other government agencies and members of the
business community, employee organizations, as well as other interested
parties (hereinafter collectively "interested parties"). 6 The NCP has the
responsibility of developing and maintaining relations with
representatives of the various interested parties that play a part in the
effective functioning of the Guidelines.37
NCPs are also responsible for making the Guidelines known to the
public.3 8 One way to accomplish this is through the use of the Internet,
making sure to translate the Guidelines into each country's national
language. 3 9 The informational and promotional duties of the NCP also
include the obligation to respond to inquiries about the Guidelines from
other NCPs, interested parties, and governments of non-adhering
countries.40
The NCP is tasked with settling any issues that arise as a result of
the implementation of the Guidelines, when a specific instance calls for
32. Id. (The committee "shall be responsible for clarification of the Guidelines.")
33. See Guidelines, supra note 5, at 37.
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Guidelines, supra note 5, at 33.
39. Id (Inward and outward investors are also to be informed about the Guidelines.)
40. Id. at 33-34.
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NCP involvement. 4 1 The NCP will serve as an opportunity for interested
parties to raise concerns in a timely manner. 42 The NCP also has the
duty to "make an initial assessment of whether the issues raised merit
further examination" and, when issues do merit further examination, to
offer assistance to the parties involved to resolve the issues.43  Such
assistance may consist of seeking the advice of interested parties,
contacting the NCPs in other countries concerned, or offering mediation
44to help deal with the issues. In the event the parties do not reach an
agreement, it is the NCP's responsibility to "make recommendations as
appropriate, on the implementation of' the Guidelines.45 Finally, when
the procedures are complete, after consultation with the parties involved,
the NCP is to make the results publicly available to the extent they
preserve confidentiality and are in the Guidelines' best interest.46
The NCPs are responsible for reporting their actions and
recommendations annually to the Investment Committee.47 The reports
must include information on the issues and activities that were in dispute
and how the issues were resolved. 4 8 After the NCPs of the various
countries report, the Investment Committee considers the reports,
whether an NCP is fulfilling its responsibilities with regard to its
handling of specific instances, and whether to issue a clarification where
an adhering country or an advisory body makes a substantiated
submission on whether an NCP has correctly interpreted the Guidelines
in specific instances. 4 9  The Investment Committee will also make
recommendations, as necessary, to improve the functioning of NCPs and
the effective implementation of the Guidelines.50
As far as the United States government is concerned, it states that it
is "committed to the effective use of the Guidelines." 5  Furthermore,
"the United States will not shrink from [its] responsibility to continue to
encourage the observance of high standards of conduct where it is
lacking. Nor will [it] allow these Guidelines to become a vehicle for
unfairly tarnishing the reputation of good corporate citizens." 52 Through
41. Id. at 34.
42. Id.
43. Guidelines, supra note 5, at 33.
44. See id. at 34.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 35.
48. See Guidelines, supra note 5, at 35.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Contact Point Information Booklet
(2002), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/oecd/book/10215.htm [hereinafter US
NCP].
52. Id.
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its comments, the United States appears committed to the Guidelines
with a degree of caution as there is concern the Guidelines may open the
door for unwarranted criticism and attacks by outside parties such as
non-governmental organizations (hereinafter "NGO")." While
remaining committed to the OECD and the Guidelines, the United States
has made clear that it also has an obligation to protect national
corporations from potential unsubstantiated criticisms. The United
States' adoption of the revised Guidelines in 2000 demonstrated its
commitment to reinforcing "high standards of corporate behavior" while
promoting a "form of globalization that not only generates wealth, but
also raises standards on social, labor, environmental, and human rights
issues." 54
B. The Guidelines as "Soft Law"
International law is made up of "hard law" and "soft law."ss While
"hard law" comes from treaties and customary international law, which
are generally binding agreements between nation-states and govern the
legal relationship between the states, only states can initiate actions for
violations. 56 Breaches of "hard law" subject states to sanctions by the
other members of the treaty or convention, which constitutes a form of
"hard law."57
On the other hand, "soft law" is an emerging trend in international
law that is not a treaty or other form of "hard law."58 "Soft law" can take
the form of "declarations, codes of conduct, guidelines, and other
promulgations [by branches] of the United Nations, operational
directives of the multilateral development institutions, and resolutions
and other statements by non-governmental organizations." 59 The biggest
difference between "hard law" and "soft law" is that "soft law" does not
carry the weight of enforcement.o Instead, soft law allows the private
53. Guidelines, supra note 5, at 33.
54. USNCP, supra note 51.
55. Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International Law: A
Paradigm for a Changing World, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159, 166 (2006).
56. Id. (citing Owen J. Lynch & Greg Maggio, Human Rights, Environment, and
Economic Development: Existing and Emerging Standards in International Law and
Global Society, Center for International Environmental Law Publications, Nov. 15, 1997,
at § II, available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/olp3ii.html).
57. Id.
5 8. Id.
59. Id. (citing Owen J. Lynch & Greg Maggio, Human Rights, Environment, and
Economic Development: Existing and Emerging Standards in International Law and
Global Society, Center for International Environmental Law Publications, Nov. 15, 1997,
at § II, available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/olp3ii.html).
60. Lakhani, supra note 55, at 166.
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sector the ability to create its own sets of guidelines and standards for the
conduct of businesses across borders.6 1
Because many countries are unwilling to give any judicial power to
extra-territorial bodies, soft law provides an outlet that is more flexible
and acceptable to those countries. 62 To many countries, "soft law" is
more acceptable because rather than being a legislative procedure that is
binding law, soft law is memorialized into "law" through contract, and
thus is more flexible.6 ' As well as being contractual, soft law is
appealing to states because it does not challenge their sovereignty. 4
Though any actor to the agreement is free to leave, there are strong
incentives to participate, with participation actually strengthening the
integrity of the voluntary network of countries. The networks that the
parties create, in effect, replace the political community while mutual
interest replaces territory to create a self-referencing system of regulation
66that binds all the parties in a web of mutual interest and constraint.
While the networks create mutual interest and restraint, soft law
does not have a direct legal effect because it is not a legislative act.67
Instead, soft law acts as a "behavioral framework" 68 that creates a sense
of obligation to which corporations and other entities feel compelled to
adhere.69 In a sense, soft law, such as the Guidelines, uses peer pressure
as a means of enforcement. 70 The Guidelines demonstrate the sense of
peer pressure through the self-regulation among the many parties
involved.' When the parties act together, they create a cohesive
obligatory network where the parties follow the behavioral norms of the
community to avoid being challenged by other actors within the network.
Not adhering to the norms of the network, such as the Guidelines, may
raise business costs for actors such as MNEs because they will be forced
to defend themselves against claims made to the NCP by other countries
61. See Larry Catd Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 499, 503-504 (2008) [hereinafter
Multinational Corporations].
62. Id. at 503.
63. Id. at 517.
64. Douglas M. Johnston, Book Reviews: Commitment and Compliance: The Role of
Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, 95 A.J.I.L. 709, 711 (2001).
65. See Multinational Corporations, supra note 61, at 518.
66. Id. at 523.
67. Id. at 508.
68. Id.
69. See Allison Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 325, 331 (2007).
70. Id. at 327.
71. See Multinational Corporations, supra note 61, at 509. The transnational system
is made up of actors including multinational enterprises, their suppliers, non-
governmental organizations, the media, investors, and consumers. Id.
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or NPOs.72 On the other hand, because the Guidelines are voluntary and
lack legal effect, MNEs may save money by not defending themselves.
The problem, however, is that MNEs who choose to save money by not
defending against allegations may lose even more in terms of bad
publicity.73
The effect of bad publicity is demonstrated in an article run in the
British newspaper, The Observer, reporting that the Gap, Inc.,
(hereinafter "Gap") had children producing Gap clothing in its textile
factories in conditions close to slavery.74 The publication of the article
brought bad publicity for Gap, forcing the company to take quick action
to correct the issues before the bad publicity grew and spiraled out of
control. In the end, corrective actions were taken, and rather than
looking bad in the public eye, Gap demonstrated its commitment to its
corporate code of conduct as well as to its strong social conscience,
boosting consumer opinion about it as a corporation.76
Because the media are actors in the soft-law system, they have the
ability to spread information regarding an MNE's deviation from the soft
law behavioral framework.7 7  "Hard law" differs in that if a country
violates a treaty, the violation can only be raised by other party-states to
the treaty. Because only states are parties to treaties, they, and not
corporations, are the only parties who can be sanctioned.
In a "soft law" system, however, there are no enforcement
mechanisms. The media and NGOs function as actors who can make
complaints to the NCP, which allows for a large degree of peer pressure
in the hopes of pushing corporate codes of conduct as well as the
Guidelines for all corporations to follow. 79
As mentioned, the flexibility of soft law means the National borders
that limit hard law do not limit soft law.80 While hard law often makes
72. Much like fending off bad publicity or putting up defense in court, there are
always costs associated with defending damaging accusations.
73. See Multinational Corporations, supra note 61, at 513.
74. Dan McDougall, Indian 'Slave' Children Found Making Low-Cost Clothes
Destined for Gap, THE OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 2007, available at
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,331090351-119093,00.html.
75. See Multinational Corporations, supra note 61, at 515.
76. Id at 514.
77. Id. at 513.
78. See Lakhani, supra note 55, at 166 (citing Owen J. Lynch & Greg Maggio,
Human Rights, Environment, and Economic Development: Existing and Emerging
Standards in International Law and Global Society, Center for International
Environmental Law Publications, Nov. 15, 1997, at § 1l, available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/olp3ii.html).
79. Id at 167.
80. See Multinational Corporations, supra note 61, at 502.
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attempts to extend its power across borders,8 ' the contractual nature of
soft law only limits its reach as far as the regions in which the parties
conduct business. 82  The reason for this is that soft-law networks are
based on actors, not territories. MNEs can travel across borders,
requiring a high level of flexibility, a flexibility that soft laws such as the
Guidelines provide.83  Insofar as networks and organizations value
flexibility over certainty and judicial enforceability, the use of soft laws
is growing.8 4  In the case of the Guidelines, the flexibility is in the
involvement of many actors who help regulate one another.85 In the end,
the integrity of the Guidelines is strengthened by the involvement of all
the actors. 86
Even without formal legal status, soft law can ultimately have a real
effect by working its way into customary international law, or by
providing the framework for interstate cooperation.87 Scholars interpret
soft law as "either not yet or not only law."88 The NGOs and MNEs that
make up the soft law frameworks will influence international law and be
a positive influence on the enforcement of laws by showing that such
laws are mutually beneficial. 89 Alternative dispute resolution on the
international level also benefits from soft law because it uses societal
norms and customs to incentivize and increase the enforcement and
binding nature of agreements that are similar to the OECD Guidelines.90
Thus, it may also be possible for soft law to influence or aid in the
creation of international hard law by providing mutually beneficial
networks from which treaties may be possible.9'
81. Id. at 507. "Among the US and the European Union-extraterritoriality is
leveraged by strategic bargaining under which standards as between these entities are
harmonized. Thus harmonized, they are extended beyond their collective borders." Id.
"States have also sought to extend their authority with the extension of substantive
regulation by entities operating or created within the home jurisdiction with respect to
their activities in other states." Id. at 502.
82. See generally Multinational Corporations, supra note 61.
83. Anna Di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. CoMp. L. 499, 505 (2006).
84. Douglas M. Johnston, Book Reviews: Commitment and Compliance: The Role of
Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, 95 A.J.I.L. 709, 713-14 (2001).
85. See generally Multinational Corporations, supra note 61.
86. See id. at 518.
87. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional
Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2008).
88. Lakhani, supra note 55, at 167 (citing Owen J. Lynch & Greg Maggio, Human
Rights, Environment, and Economic Development: Existing and Emerging Standards in
International Law and Global Society, Center for International Environmental Law
Publications, Nov. 15, 1997, at § II, available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/
olp3ii.html.).
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 87, at 575.
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C. Problems With Soft Law
Regardless of the work of many scholars to establish soft law as a
legitimate subject of study, some still insist that soft law does not exist.92
Arguing that the concept of soft law is merely a pledge or contract rather
than any form of substantive law, Kal Raustiala argues that scholars draw
their conclusions from weak evidence of state practice. Raustiala
reasons that the many agreements are labeled "soft law" rather than
treating them as regular contracts or pledges because they lack the
traditional qualities of international law. 94 He goes on to say that these
agreements should not be labeled as soft law on an empirical basis
because states behave as if legal agreements are decisively different from
non-legal agreements. 9 5 States do not designate different levels of laws,
with some being softer, some harder, and some not law at all.96 Instead,
states carefully choose the nature of their agreements in a black-and-
white fashion, either making them law or not law. 97 While hard law can
be flexible, 9 8 it is also declared law by the states. Raustiala uses the
Helsinki Final Act as an example because of the importance the parties to
the agreement put on its nonbinding nature.99 Raustiala argues that the
Act is not law because both parties clearly stated the Act was not a treaty
or legally binding. 00
The Helsinki Final Act can be compared to the OECD's Guidelines
because they are voluntary and nonbinding.o'0 By extension, Raustiala's
argument would suggest the Guidelines are merely a pledge due to their
nonbinding nature and because the member-states have not declared the
Guidelines to be law.'0 2 If the OECD and the Guidelines are not a form
of law, and the United States has not declared them to be legally binding,
then according to the view of soft-law critics, the United States would
have no obligation to abide by the Guidelines aside from mutual respect
with the other parties.103
92. See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 581, 586 (2005).
93. Id. at 588.
94. Id
95. Id at 587.
96. Id.
97. See Raustiala, supra note 92, at 587.
98. Id. at 589 (Imprecision does not affect the legal character of domestic laws
where standards such as "reasonable person," "due process," and "good faith" are used.).
99. Id. at 587.
100. Id.
I 01. See generally Guidelines, supra note 5.
102. See Raustiala, supra note 92, at 587.
103. Id. at 588.
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Aside from the criticism that it is not a true form of law, soft-law
also faces enforceability issues"10 The OECD Guidelines are "rich in
principle, but weak in enforcement."' 05 Because of problems with
enforceability, NCPs have almost ceased to exist.106 Unlike hard law,
soft-law enforcement is more a matter of discreet persuasion by OECD
officials and member countries, or public embarrassment through the
media. 0 7  The NCP's role in the process is to provide a forum for
discussion where the parties to the complaint may raise the issues.'0 If
the parties cannot come to a resolution themselves, the NCP is tasked
with issuing a statement that provides recommendations on how to
implement the Guidelines.109 Aside from the recommendations, there are
no further actions the NCP must take to resolve the issue." 0 The general
lack of bite possessed by the Guidelines and other forms of soft law are
the biggest source of criticism.
III. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE OECD GUIDELINES
The United Kingdom has been quite active in its enforcement and
promotion of the OECD Guidelines." 2 While the United States provides
a quarter of the OECD's annual budget, the United Kingdom provides
seven and a half percent. 1' 3 As one of the world's more active NCPs," l4
the United Kingdom's NCP will be used as a base for comparing the
United States NCP's enforcement and promotion of the Guidelines.
104. See Bob Hepple, Papers of the Joint Japan-U.S.-E. U. Project on Labor Law in
the 21st Century: A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 20 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 347, 354 (1999).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Lance Compa and Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Doing Business in China
and Latin America: Developments in Comparative and International Labor Law:
Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 671 (1995).
108. See Guidelines, supra note 5, at 34.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Hepple, supra note 104, at 360.
112. See generally Department for Business Innovation & Skills, UK National
Contact Point for OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, http://www.berr.
gov.uk/whatwedo/sectors/lowcarbon/cr-sd-wp/nationalcontactpoint/page 45873.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter UK NCP].
113. See Contributions, supra note 2.
114. See generally UK NCP, supra note 112.
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A. Global Witness v. Afrimex
On February 20, 2007, the UK NCP received a request from Global
Witness to consider a complaint against Afrimex UK Ltd."s In its
underlying complaint, Global Witness alleged that Afrimex paid taxes to
rebel forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo and failed to practice
sufficient due diligence on the supply chain, sourcing minerals from
mines that used child labor and forced labor under unacceptable health
and safety practices." 6  The claim arose out of actions relating to the
global market for coltan, a metal used in the production of cell phones
and other consumer electronics.'"7 Specifically, Global Witness alleged
that Afrimex did not comply with Chapter II (General Policies), Chapter
IV (Employment and Industrial Relations) and Chapter VI (Combating
Bribery) of the Guidelines." 8 Afrimex fought the claims, which resulted
in the decisions by the UK NCP." 9
Global Witness' claims were based on Afrimex's activities in the
Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") between 1998 and February
2007.120 In evaluating Afrimex's actions, the NCP considered only
actions that took place after 2000, but looked at pre-2000 conduct as
circumstantially relevant to the post-2000 actions.121
There were two main sources for Global Witness' claims.12 2 The
first related to the conflict zone within the DRC,123 while the second
focused on the relations between the entities that were responsible for the
conduct at issue.124 Data and fieldwork compiled by UN officials were
critical to the NCP's decisions regarding the state of affairs in the region
at the time.12 5 The UN's report was the basis for presuming the DRC's
conflict was a result of the desire to control the region's mineral
115. See UK NCP, Global Witness v. Afrimex (28 August 2008) [6].
116. Id.
117. Larry Cati Backer, Rights and Accountability in Development ('RAID') v. Das
Air and Global Witness v. Afrimex: Small Steps Towards an Autonomous Transnational
Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 21, on file with author, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1427883) [hereinafter Small Steps].
118. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [13].
119. Id.at[14]-[16].
120. Id. at [7].
121. Id. The new Guidelines came into force in June 2000, and while the NCP "will
not make a determination about the allegations prior to June 2000, the NCP considers that
past behavior is pertinent when considering behavior that occurred after June 2000." Id.
122. See generally Small Steps, supra note 117.
123. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [8]-[12].
124. Id. at [17]-[26].
125. Id. at [20].
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resources.126 The illegal mining activities in the DRC included the direct
exchange of arms for natural resources by international corporations
working in the DRC.12 7 The UK NCP analyzed not only the movement
of arms and the conflict in the DRC, but also analyzed other UN
activities relating to the conflict in the DRC, to support the presumption
of an "explicit link between minerals and funding rebel groups." 28
The UK NCP focused on any connection between Afrimex to both
the DRC and the suspicious activity. 29  In order to establish a
connection, the NCP would have needed to connect Afrimex to the
Congolese companies Societe Kotecha or SOCOMI.130  Even after
Afrimex's effort to establish that a separation of business existed
between them and the other two companies,' ' the UK NCP found a
connection sufficient to put Afrimex in a position to "influence Societe
Kotecha and SOCOMI."l 32  Therefore the companies were treated as
connected for the purpose of the UK NCP's decision.' 3 3 Just because the
companies were found to have had a connection did not mean that the
companies were each other's alter egos; rather, the connection only
suggested that the companies could have acted as alter egos. 134
With the companies being evaluated as if they were linked, the UK
NCP applied the Guidelines to the facts that stood as the basis of Global
Witness' complaint.'3 5  The NCP found a connection between the
companies and found that Afrimex had failed to uphold its duties under
the Guidelines when it did not influence SOCOMI to stop paying taxes
and licensing fees to Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie
("RCD-Goma"),136 a rebel group that operated within the DRC conflict
zone.137
126. See UN DRC Panel, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo,
215, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) [hereinafter UN Panel].
127. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [9].
128. Id.at[1l].
129. See Small Steps, supra note I17, at 23; See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [29]-[571.
130. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [17]-[24]. The two enterprises were involved in
the region, and believed to even be part of the same company as Afrimex. UK NCP,
Global Witness v. Afrimex (28 August 2008) [20].
131. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [21]-[24].
132. Id. at [27].
133. Id.
134. See Small Steps, supra note 117, at 23.
135. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [29]-51].
136. Id. at [39].
137. Id. at [38].
The International Peace Information Service (IPIS), implies that Afrimex was
SOCOMI's only export customer during the period of the statistics collected in
2000/01. If this is the case, Afrimex was the reason that SOCOMI traded in
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The UK NCP also considered the possible violation of the supply
chain conduct rules of the Guidelines because SOCOMI was not
Afrimex's only supplier, and Afrimex would have been in a position to
influence its other business partners and suppliers.' The NCP
concluded that Afrimex had failed to conduct due diligence with regard
to its suppliers, and therefore had failed to fulfill the requirements of the
Guidelines.'3 9 Afrimex's failure to fulfill the requirements resulted in the
taxation payments going down Afrimex's supply chain, and funding the
conflict.140  While Afrimex's level of due diligence may have been
acceptable outside a conflict zone, the fact that it had occurred in the
DRC conflict zone proved it to be unacceptable, as a greater level of
scrutiny was required due to weaker governmental authority.141
The NCP also determined that Afrimex was aware of the situation
in the DRC and was active in the conflict zone.142 Though Afrimex did
not pay taxes to the rebel group RCD-Goma, the NCP concluded that
Afrimex had not taken the necessary steps to prevent SOCOMI from
paying taxes and fees for mineral licenses to RCD-Goma, resulting in the
failure to meet the requirements of the Guidelines.14 3 Though the NCP
concluded Afrimex did not pay taxes while SOCOMI and Societe
Kotecha did, the NCP did not consider any of the payments to be
bribery.144 Furthermore, the NCP concluded that Afrimex had failed to
apply sufficient due diligence to its supply chain by not taking the
necessary steps to influence its supply chain to explore options for
sourcing minerals from mines without child or forced labor, and with
better health and safety conditions. 14
In response to Afrimex's violations, the NCP recommended that
Afrimex directly apply a number of international norms and standards to
its business.14 6 Along with the recommendations, Afrimex offered to
formulate a corporate-responsibility document to shape its future
actions. 147 In its resolution, the NCP stated that Afrimex had to take
proactive steps to understand how its existing and proposed activities
minerals and therefore Afrimex is responsible for SOCOMI paying the license
fees and taxation to RCD-Goma....
Id.
138. Id. at [40].
139. Id. at [51].
140. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [51].
141. See Small Steps, supra note 117, at 25.
142. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at (58].
143. Id. at [59].
144. Id. at [60].
145. Id. at [62].
146. See Small Steps, supra note 117, at 25.
147. See Afrimex, supra note 115, at [63].
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affected human rights in the DRC.148 The NCP also referred Afrimex to
the OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak
Governance Zones, which has been developed as part of the OECD's
Investment Committee's follow up to the Guidelines.14 9
The NCP's decision on Afrimex shows that the Guidelines can have
an important influence on cross-border corporate behavior.s 0 Most
important is the scholarly suggestion that soft-law principles are an
important substitute for hard law in weak government areas and that the
decision suggests the power of transnational legal standards to be a
powerful supplement or surrogate for national standards. '5
B. RAID v. DAS Air
On April 28, 2005, the UK NCP received another complaint, this
time from RAID (Rights and Accountability in Development) alleging
breaches of UN embargoes by DAS Air.152 The case against DAS Air
was brought in the UK because DAS Air was registered in the UK.'15 In
the complaint, RAID alleged that DAS Air had transported coltan,
originating in a conflict zone, from the DRC through the operation of
civilian aircraft. 54
While RAID's complaint sought to establish UN embargo violations
for DAS Air flights in the region during the conflict, the Guidelines,
under which the complaint was made, did not take effect until 2000.ss
Because most of DAS Air's flights in the DRC had occurred prior to
2000, the UK NCP focused on the three flights that occurred after 2000,
148. Id. at [65].
149. Id. at [671. The Risk Awareness tool consists of a list of questions that
companies should ask themselves when considering actual or prospective investments in
weak governance zones. These questions cover obeying the law and observing
international relations; heightened managerial care; political activities; knowing clients
and business partners; speaking out about wrongdoing; and business roles in weak
governance societies-a broadened view of self interest. Id. The tool also states that
companies have the same responsibilities in weak governments. Id. at 68. The Risk
Awareness tool is available at www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/26/21/36885821.pdf.
150. See Small Steps, supra note 117, at 27.
151. Id.at26.
152. See UK NCP, DAS Air (21 July 2008) [1]. RAID is a Non-Government
Organization that was founded in 1997 that aims through its research to promote social
and economic rights to impose corporate accountability. Id. at [6]. Coltan is the
colloquial African name for columbite-tantalite, a metallic ore used to produce the
elements niobium and tantalum, primarily used for the production of capacitors, which
are vital components in electronic devices. Id. at [12].
153. Id at [7]. DAS Air is a long established UK based air-freight-services business.
Id.
154. Id at[l].
155. Id. at [9].
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using the prior 32 pre-2000 flights as circumstantial evidence of DAS
Air's continued violations. 56
The UK NCP based its decision on factual determinations that had
been generated through various commissions investigating DAS Air. 5 7
In June 2000, the UN Security Council appointed an independent panel
of experts to follow up on reports and to collect information regarding
the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC.'5 8 The panel was
also tasked with evaluating the exploitation of the DRC's natural
resources and the continuation of the conflict.'5 9 In its reports, the UN
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo found that
the conflict was mainly about access to and control of coltan, diamonds,
copper, cobalt and gold.160  What was damaging to DAS Air was the
Panel's finding that the company was transporting coltan from the
conflict zone to Europe.16' This fact became the basis for the complaint
against DAS Air.' 6 2
Following the report by the UN Panel of Experts, a Ugandan
Judicial Commission led by Ugandan Justice Porter was established to
look at the allegations in the UN Report.'63  The Porter Commission
found that military airbases were being used to transport goods for
civilian reasons.' 64 More specifically, the Ugandan military bases were
being used to hide civilian trade occurring in the conflict zone.' 65 The
allegations against DAS Air stemmed from the hidden civilian flights
arriving at and departing from the military bases.16 6
In its decision, the UK NCP rejected DAS Air's claim that the
Porter Commission's findings were fabricated and unsubstantiated.167
Without proof to the contrary, the UK NCP found that DAS Air did fly
into the conflict zone, and that the flights were improperly classified as
military flights rather than civil flights so as to avoid violations of "the
Chicago Convention."' 6 8  The UK NCP also looked at DAS Air's
156. Id.
157. See DAS Air, supra note 152, at [17]-[24].
158. Id. at [17].
159. Id. at [5].
160. Id. at [18].
161. Id. at [19].
162. See DAS Air, supra note 152, at [20].
163. Id. at [21].
164. Id. at [22]-[24].
165. Id. at (231.
166. Id. at [24].
167. See DASAir, supra note 152, at [29].
168. Id. at [30]. Formally titled the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(CICA), the convention consists of a number of principles and arrangements to which
governments have agreed so that international civil aviation may develop in a safe and
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internal governance regarding its transportation activities.16 9 It accepted
the conclusions of the UN Panel that the private sector played a role in
the continuation of the war by trading the minerals that were the source
of the conflict.170 Based on the Panel's findings, the UK NCP found that
DAS Air had not adhered to the heightened care required of companies
when investing and trading in weak governance zones. 17 ' The UK NCP
also found that DAS Air could have influenced its third-party contacts
through contracts for the transportation of coltan.17 2 DAS Air could do
this because it had a significant market share of the flights that
transported minerals out of the DRC and had a specialized knowledge of
the region, which knowledge the UK NCP believed should have yielded
a clear understanding that the minerals might have come from conflict
zones.173 Since DAS Air had not made an effort to learn the source of
the minerals it was transporting, the UK NCP found that DAS Air had
failed to undertake sufficient due diligence on its supply chain.174
In its conclusions, the UK NCP found that DAS Air had failed to
meet the requirements of the Guidelines.'7 5 The UK NCP also stated that
it expected UK businesses to follow international conventions, such as
the Chicago Convention,17 6 and urged UK companies to use their
influence to ensure due diligence when trading natural resources from
orderly manner, and so that equality of opportunity is the basis for the establishment of
international civil air transport. Id.
169. See Small Steps, supra note 117, at 20.
170. See DAS Air, supra note 152, at [42].
171. Id. at [43]. The NCP stated:
There is no evidence that DAS Air made any concessions to the conflict
occurring in the region. DAS Air transported minerals from Kigali, which had
a reasonable probability of having been sourced from the conflict zone in the
DRC, on behalf of its customers.
Id.
172. Id. at [44].
173. Id. at [44]. DAS Air stated to the NCP that it did not question the source of the
mineral that it transported. Id
174. Id. at [44].
175. See DAS Air, supra note 152, at [50].
The lack of due diligence on the supply chain, meant DAS Air did not meet the
requirements of the following paragraphs of the Guidelines:
II.1 Contribute to economic, social and environmental progress with a
view to achieving sustainable development.
11.2 Respect the human rights of those affected by their activities
consistent with the host government's international obligations and
commitments.
11.10 Encourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers
and sub-contractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible
with the guidelines.
Id.
176. Id. at [51].
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conflict regions.17 7 Finally, the UK NCP pointed to the OECD Risk
Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance
Zones for questions UK companies should ask themselves before
investing in weak governance zones. 7 8
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND THE OECD GUIDELINES
For the United States, involvement with the OECD falls under the
U.S. Department of State.17 9 If the United States' website regarding the
OECD is in any way indicative of its utilization of the Guidelines, the
United States does not appear to put forth much effort beyond
contributing to the yearly budget.'80 While the United Kingdom's
website provides procedures for filing NCP complaints and past UK
NCP cases,'8 ' the United States NCP website provides little more than a
recital of the basic provisions of the OECD Guidelines themselves.182
The United States website states that the country hopes to ensure that
other countries match the United States' standards.' 83
A. My Experience Contacting the National Contact Point
When I first attempted to make contact with the United States NCP
by phone, I found that the phone numbers listed on the website were
disconnected. After calling all available numbers in an effort to get a
hold of someone in the Department of State who was involved with the
OECD, I reached the office of the NCP. Any excitement gained from
my find was quickly diminished when the office of the NCP informed
me that there were no cases or information that could be provided to
demonstrate the NCP's activities relating to the Guidelines.184 Instead,
the office of the NCP suggested I contact another country whose NCP
was more active and would have information to provide.'8 5
The conversations with the office of the NCP paired with the lack of
information on the United States NCP's website lead to the conclusion
that the United States falls far short of the effort taken by other countries,
namely the United Kingdom, to promote the Guidelines and to ensure it
177. Id. at [54].
178. Id.
179. See United States Department of State, OECD, http://www.state.gov/e/ eeb/oecd/
(last visited Jan. 6, 2010) [hereinafter US DoS].
180. Id.
181. See generally UK NCP, supra note 112.
182. See generally US DoS, supra note 179.
183. See generally US NCP, supra note 5 1.
184. Telephone Interview with United States National Contact Point, United States
Department of State (Sept. 26, 2009).
18 5. Id.
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is used. For a country that provides a quarter of the OECD's yearly
budget,'8 6 the United States does not appear to uphold even the most
basic obligation of publicizing the Guidelines and making known the
procedures for filing a complaint with the NCP.
V. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE OECD GUIDELINES AND THE
NATIONAL CONTACT POINT
Though the use of the Guidelines and NCPs is heavily reliant on
peer pressure, it offers solutions to issues that may not otherwise be
available.' 87  The reason for this is that companies are specialized
economic enterprises, not public-interest organizations., 88  The treaties
and international agreements that govern States do not govern the duties
and responsibilities of a corporation or a separate economic organ.1 8 9
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act
If not for the availability of the NCP and the Guidelines, claims for
violations of international law would have to be brought through avenues
such as the Alien Tort Claims Act (hereinafter "ATCA") in the United
States.190 The ATCA gives federal courts original jurisdiction over "any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 9' With that said, one of the
major problems with the ATCA is that claims can only be brought for
violations of international law, not violations of agreements between
nations.192
To demonstrate the difficulty of bringing a case under the ATCA, to
date, only two cases stemming from the ATCA have gone to a federal
jury trial.'93  In Doe v. Unocal, Unocal Corporation was sued in the
Central District of California for numerous alleged human-rights
186. See Contributions, supra note 2.
187. See generally Sarah A. Altschuller and Amy Lehr, Corporate Social
Responsibility, 43 INT'L L. 577 (2009).
188. See generally Special Representative for the Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, Summary, Delivered to the U.N. Human Rights Council,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrcouncil/8session/reports.htm.
189. Id.
190. See generally Altschuller & Lehr, supra note 187.
191. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789) [hereinafter ATCA].
192. See generally Altschuller & Lehr, supra note 187. Federal courts now recognize
jurisdiction under the ATCA when three conditions are met: (1) an alien sues; (2) the suit
is for a tort; and (3) the plaintiff alleges a violation of international law. See William J.
Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in U.S. Courts: An Overview of Transnational Law
Litigation, 49 FED. LAW. 33, 34 (2002).
193. Id.
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violations that had occurred during the development of a natural-gas
pipeline in Myanmar.' 94 The court found that nonstate actors could be
held liable for violations of international treaties and agreements even
without state action.195 The court also determined the international-law
standard for when a corporation could be liable for the acts of another
party.196 In the end, the court held that Unocal could not be held liable
for the actions of the Myanmar government if Unocal did not also
actively participate in those violations.'97
While Unocal was not held liable, the case recognizes the potential
liability of MNEs for both their own actions and the actions of partners
and joint ventures.98 At the same time, the case illustrates the many
difficulties in bringing a successful ATCA action against an MNE.' 99
The difficulties stem from the fact that courts generally construe the
ATCA narrowly. 2 00 One difficulty that is discussed in the Unocal case is
that the MNE must engage in "practical assistance or encouragement"
that has a direct and substantial effect on the violation. 20 1 Put another
way, a corporation cannot be held liable merely for investing in a country
where the government or someone in the supply chain engages in
202
violations of international law. Proving that the corporation took an
active role in any violation is extremely expensive because the events
that lead to the claims under the ATCA do not usually occur in the
United States, and the costs associated with international discovery and
the required travel are not slight. 20 3
194. See generally Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1310.
197. Id. There was evidence presented that Unocal knew of the forced labor, and that
it was benefitting from its usage, but the court found that such evidence was not enough
to "establish liability under international law." Id.
198. See William J. Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in the US. Courts: An
Overview of Transnational Law Litigation, 49 FED. LAw. 33, 37 (2002).
199. See generally Unocal, supra note 194, at 1310.
200. See Helen C. Lucas, The Adjudication of Violations of International Law Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act: Allowing Alien Plaintiffs Their Day in Federal Court, 36
DEPAUL L. Rev. 231, 238 (1987). Several recurring questions appear in the case law:
(1) Has an actual violation of international law occurred? See Benjamins v. British
European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978). (2) Does international law grant a
private cause of action? See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801-08
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). (3) Does international law impose liability upon
private actors for private conduct? See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). (4) Is adjudication of the claim barred by one or more of the doctrines of
political question, sovereign immunity, and act of state? Id.
201. See Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate
Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REv. 971, 979 (2004) (citing Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2004]
EWCA Civil 1394, 1, PP 61-68 (Oct. 28, 2004)).
202. See Unocal, supra note 194, at 1310.
203. See Cleveland, supra note 201, at 982.
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Along with the difficulty of directly tying a corporation to violations
of international law, the complexity of corporate forms creates another
problem for plaintiffs. 204 Corporations and their networks of subsidiaries
are structured to limit liability, and given the instability in some
developing countries, MNEs are wise to shield themselves from their
foreign subsidiaries.205 Because federal courts usually have personal
jurisdiction over the parent companies, plaintiffs often go after the parent
under the ATCA.206 In cases of complex corporate forms and structures,
plaintiffs face an uphill battle because courts generally respect the
corporate form's limited-liability character.20 7 Suggestions have been
made that when a corporation, rather than an individual, is a shareholder,
the shield of limited liability should be lifted and the corporate parent
held liable for the actions (or lack of action) of its subsidiaries. 20 8 But,
until courts look differently upon corporate form and limited liability,
plaintiffs will have to deal with limited liability as a barrier to their
ATCA cases.209
If, however, a plaintiff can afford the expenses of litigation and
successfully dodges the parent company's limited liability, he or she is
still not out of the woods.2o In moving forward with a case, plaintiffs
must also contend with U.S. foreign relations.21 1 If the litigation in any
way interferes with U.S. foreign relations, the courts may have to deal
with the executive branch urging for dismissal, a move that has proven
successful in the past.212 Whether the executive acts to save peace
213
negotiations, or generally just to save relations with a foreign
204. See Lorelle Londis, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an
Old Statute Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV.
141, 170 (2005).
205. Id. at 178. Limited liability was established to minimize shareholder liability
and to encourage risk-taking in the United States. It is important to ask "whether the
justification for limited liability-thickened by layer upon layer of wholly- and partly-
owned subsidiaries as well as joint ventures across multiple countries and differing legal
systems-extends so readily to [MNEs]." Id. at 179.
206. Id. at 170. "Doctrines employed to analyze the liability of a parent corporation
include: piercing the corporate veil, integrated enterprise liability, agency-based liability,
aiding and abetting, and ratification." Id.
207. Id at 170.
208. Id. at 179 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law, 55 (1991)).
209. See generally Londis, supra note 204, at 182-88.
210. See Cleveland, supra note 201, at 982-88.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 983 (citing Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1178-79 (C.D.
Cal. 2002)).
213. See generally Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F.Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal 2002)
(dismissed based in part on the United States' representation that the litigation was
disrupting a dubious indigenous peace negotiation).
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214country, the U.S. Supreme Court has deferred to the executive
branch's interpretations of the impact cases will have on foreign
policy. 2 15
If statistics were not enough to demonstrate the difficulty of
bringing a successful ATCA claim, the lingering threat of encroachment
on foreign policy and the deference given to the executive branch clearly
show the fragility of any ATCA case.2 16
B. Other Possible Alternatives
Aside from the ATCA, there are very limited outlets where judicial
enforcement of international laws can be sought.217 International-law
claims cannot be brought to state courts because the courts will lack
jurisdiction to hear the cases.218 The ATCA grants exclusive jurisdiction
to federal courts for violations of international law, jurisdiction that state
courts do not have.2 19
Prosecution of MNEs in other countries has not proven much more
successful than cases brought in the United States. 22 0 An example of this
is the case of Trafigura, a Dutch MINE based in London, which was
charged with dumping toxic waste in municipal dumps in the Ivory
Coast, causing thousands of people to suffer health problems.2 21
Trafigura argued that it hired an Ivorian company to handle the waste,
and was therefore not liable.222 The Ivorian Court of Appeal found
insufficient evidence with which to charge Trafigura but sentenced the
head of the Ivorian company that was alleged to have handled the waste
to twenty years in jail, thus demonstrating the difficulty in prosecuting
MNEs on an individual state level.223
214. See generally Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
State, to the Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, U.S. District Court Judge for the District of
Columbia (July 19, 2002), available at http://www.laborrights.org (argument that lawsuit
could alienate Indonesian government, therefore affecting its willingness to participate in
the war on terror).
215. See Cleveland, supra note 201, at 983. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.
Ct. 2739, 2766, n.21 (2004)).
216. Id. at 971. The Rio Tinto court dismissed the case almost solely on the
opposition expressed in the Executive branch's Statement of Interest. See Sarei v. Rio
Tinto PLC, 221 F.Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
217. Id. at 972.
218. See generally id. at 971.
219. See generally ATCA, supra note 19 1.
220. See generally Altschuller & Lehr, supra note 187.
221. See generally Two Jailed Over Ivorian Pollution, BBC NEws, Oct. 23, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/768556 I.stm.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Though soft law many not have the enforceability of hard law and
may be voluntary for member-states, it still can fill gaps in hard laws.2 24
The Guidelines along with NCPs offer a procedure and venue for
interested parties to bring actions against MNEs for violations of
standards agreed upon by a transnational group of nations. 2 25 What the
Guidelines lack in enforceability, they make up for in flexibility.226
Without the Guidelines, affected parties would have to rely on statutes
such as the ATCA, which has never led to a plaintiff-favorable
227judgment. Then again, as it currently stands, an interested party in the
United States may have no course of action, as the U.S. NCP provides no
procedures for filing a claim and cannot even provide examples of past
work it has completed.228 The situation would be much different in the
United Kingdom, where the NCP provides information regarding the
procedures to follow for a claim, as well as a list of past
recommendations.229
In the absence of an effective alternative method of holding MNEs
accountable for their actions abroad, the Guidelines provide an option
that while not based on hard law can effect change through the use of
peer pressure.2 30 After all, if the use of the ATCA has never led to a
judgment for a plaintiff, the possibility that peer pressure leads to any
form of remedy for a violation of the Guidelines is a substantial
improvement. The Guidelines also provide an option where state law
fails to meet a plaintiffs needs.2 3' Where hard law fails to provide
outlets to resolve problems, the use of soft law, more specifically the
Guidelines, puts options in front of interested parties or NGOs that may
be monitoring violations of transnational law.
The Guidelines will grow stronger as more and more countries
adhere to it and promote it, since the Guidelines is built on mutual
23
respect among the member-states.232 As the largest contributor to the
OECD, and as one of the most influential countries in the world, the
United States should do more to both utilize and advertise the
Guidelines. By adhering to the OECD agreements, the United States can
enhance its international credibility towards corporate responsibility,
224. See generally Christians, supra note 69.
225. See generally Guidelines, supra note 5.
226. See generally Christians, supra note 69.
227. See generally Altschuller & Lehr, supra note 187.
228. See US NCP, supra note 51.
229. See UK NCP, supra note 112.
230. See generally Multinational Corporations, supra note 61.
231. See generally Altschuller & Lehr, supra note 187.
232. See generally Christians, supra note 69.
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while simultaneously strengthening the system that is already in place.
In the end, transnational-law litigation provides a voice for victims who
would have no other outlets and a forum to hear their claims. The United
States should make an effort to remove any limits on such litigation, and
should put in place mechanisms that affirm the law of nations and that
ensure that all victims may receive justice.2 34 The best option, and
maybe the only effective option, is a commitment to the OECD
Guidelines.
233. See generally Cleveland, supra note 201.
234. See Aceves, supra note 198, at 38.
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